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The paper explores the relationship between financial stability, 
deflation, and monetary policy. A discussion of narrow liquidity,
broad liquidity, market liquidity, and financial distress provides the
foundation for the analysis. There are two preliminary conclusions.
Equity prices are a misleading guide for interest rate policy.
Monetary policy tactics protect market liquidity while maximizing
the central bank’s leverage over longer-term interest rates and 
aggregate demand. 
Monetary policy is a fundamental source of deflation and stagna-
tion risk when price stability is fully credible. A central bank can be
fooled by its own credibility for low inflation into being insuffi-
ciently preemptive in a business expansion. Then monetary policy
can be constrained by the zero bound from reducing real interest
rates enough in the subsequent contraction. The chain of events 
that leads to deflation and stagnation can be weakened or broken 
in a number of places. Monetary policy has the power to preempt
deflation and the power to overcome the zero bound to restore 
prosperity after a deflationary shock. Fiscal policy is likely to be 
relatively ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. 
Key  words:  Banking policy; Deflation; Financial distress;
Financial stability; Liquidity; Monetary policy; Zero
bound on interest ratesI. Introduction
Experience shows that credible price level stability is the foundation of effective 
monetary policy. In the last two decades, central banks acquired credibility by consis-
tently taking policy actions to hold the line on inflation. Low and steady inflation is
generally credited with improving macroeconomic performance around the world.
However, the era of low inflation has not brought an end to boom and bust cycles
related to financial instability.
1 For instance, there was the run-up and sharp correc-
tion in U.S. equity markets in 1987, and in Japanese equity and real estate prices a
few years later. More recently, U.S. equity prices made enormous gains well in excess
of historical experience. There were two worldwide financial crises, one originating in
East Asia in 1997 and the other following the Russian debt default in 1998. These
latter events were marked by a sudden collapse of confidence in credit markets, 
resulting in a rapid destruction of market liquidity and a flight to safety. As a result of
these and other experiences, central bankers and economists have begun to consider
what monetary policy can and should do in addition to maintaining low inflation to
stabilize asset markets and the macroeconomy. 
The conquest of inflation increases the chances that a cyclical downturn could
push an economy into deflation and stagnation, as has happened already in Japan.
2
Policy makers and macroeconomists are currently divided in thinking about the
nature of deflation and the monetary policy response to it. The division of opinion
about deflation is reminiscent of the views about inflation in the mid-1950s. Today,
most seem to regard the risk as small that the U.S. economy will experience deflation
in the next couple of decades. Moreover, the profession is divided about how to deal
with deflation if the nominal short-term interest rate hits the zero bound, as it has 
in Japan. Many policy makers would rely on fiscal not monetary policy to combat
deflation at the zero bound, much as many favored fiscal over monetary policy to
fight inflation in the 1950s. This paper concludes the opposite: monetary policy has
the power to preempt deflationary forces, and the power to overcome the zero bound
on interest rates to restore price stability and prosperity after a deflationary shock.
Fiscal policy, on the other hand, is likely to be relatively ineffective at best and 
counterproductive at worst. 
The exploration of financial stability, deflation, and monetary policy begins 
in Chapter II by distinguishing between various aspects of financial stability. The 
discussion lays the foundation for the analysis in Chapters III and IV. Chapter II
opens with a brief review of monetary and secular influences on asset prices. There is
a discussion of three aspects of liquidity: narrow liquidity, broad liquidity, and market
liquidity. All three have the potential to influence asset prices significantly. The
nature and consequences of financial distress are reviewed next. Financial distress
amplifies asset price fluctuations and contributes to macroeconomic instability.
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1. See International Monetary Fund (2000) for a useful empirical survey of the relationship between asset prices and
the business cycle. 
2. Hetzel (1999), International Monetary Fund (1999b), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(1998), Posen (1998), and Ueda (1997) discuss macroeconomic developments in Japan.Chapter II concludes with a discussion of the role of financial distress in the collapse
of the U.S. savings and loan (S&L) industry in the 1980s. 
Chapter III assesses the actual and potential influence of asset markets on mone-
tary policy in light of the discussion in Chapter II. There are two main points. First,
equity prices can be a misleading guide for interest rate policy. Second, monetary 
policy tactics have evolved to protect market liquidity and to maximize the central
bank’s leverage over longer-term interest rates and aggregate demand. 
Chapter IV identifies forces that put an economy at risk of deflation and stagna-
tion when inflation is low. Asset prices are seen as a conduit rather than a source of
deflationary shocks; asset prices amplify and propagate more fundamental forces.
Monetary policy is regarded as a fundamental source of deflation and stagnation risk.
The analysis identifies two problems for monetary policy. The first is that a central
bank can be fooled by its own credibility for low inflation into being insufficiently
preemptive in a business expansion. An unsustainable boom can produce a capital
stock overhang, impair balance sheets, and subsequently require low or negative
interest rates to avert deflation and restore prosperity. The second problem is that
monetary policy can be immobilized at the zero bound on nominal interest rates.
The discussion makes clear that the chain of events that leads to deflation 
and stagnation can be weakened or broken in a number of places. The central 
bank should take care to be sufficiently preemptive in a boom. The central bank
should prepare to undertake aggressive open market purchases if the zero bound on
nominal interest rates is ever reached. The central bank should put in place systems
to impose a carry tax on bank reserves and currency so that nominal interest can 
be made negative if need be. Policy makers should be aware of the limitations and
counterproductive potential of seemingly stimulative fiscal policy initiatives.
Regulators should position themselves to resolve financial distress in the banking 
system at an early date. 
II. Aspects of Financial Stability
Chapter II reviews influences on asset prices relevant for the discussion in 
Chapters III and IV. Monetary policy is one of the factors that potentially influences
asset prices. Real factors such as productivity growth, and financial factors such as 
liquidity and financial distress, are the major determinants of asset prices over time.
The discussion presents an overview of the consequences for asset prices of these 
sorts of factors. 
A. Monetary Influences on Asset Prices
Monetary policy was a particularly important source of macroeconomic instability
and cyclical volatility in asset prices in the period of go-stop policy prior to the 
stabilization of inflation in the early 1980s.
3 In those days, excessively easy monetary
policy in the go phase of a policy cycle proceeded until a consensus developed to
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3. Go-stop monetary policy is discussed in Goodfriend (1997).fight inflation. Asset prices would tend to fall in tandem with tighter monetary policy
for three reasons. First, long-term interest rates would rise with an increase in 
inflation expectations. Second, the increase in real short-term interest rates brought
about by tighter monetary policy would raise long rates even further. Third, 
monetary policy worked to bring inflation down by precipitating a recession, which
caused a decline in expected future real earnings. Equity prices would fall because
future earnings were discounted at higher interest and because earnings themselves
were expected to be lower.
However, the relationship between asset prices and the business cycle has been 
relatively loose over the years. Asset prices are forward looking. Hence, asset prices
have the potential to lead the business cycle, or to move and then reverse field in
anticipation of cyclical fluctuations that fail to be realized. Moreover, the stabilization
of inflation has the potential to weaken the cyclical sensitivity of asset prices entirely.
In the absence of go-stop monetary policy, inflation expectations are firmly anchored,
employment and earnings are more stable, and real short-term interest rate variability
is attenuated. With long-term interest rates and expected earnings less cyclically 
variable, asset prices exhibit less cyclical sensitivity, too. 
However, fully credible price stability creates another problem for monetary 
policy. Non-inflationary potential GDP may appear in an expansion to be greater
than it is. Monetary policy makers can be fooled by their own credibility into letting
a boom continue too long with adverse consequences for asset prices and economic
activity in the subsequent bust. The nature of this kind of policy mistake and its
effect on asset prices and the economy are discussed in connection with the potential
for deflation and stagnation in Chapter IV.
B. Secular Influences on Asset Prices
Secular factors have the potential to exercise larger and more persistent effects on
asset prices. For instance, lower productivity growth probably helped to hold equity
prices down in the 1970s. The increase in productivity growth appears to have 
contributed to the run-up in U.S. equity prices in the 1990s. In a developing 
economy, a take-off to faster productivity growth can produce a big increase in equity
values. The slowing of productivity growth in a maturing miracle economy can cause
its equity prices to fall.
4 The introduction of new productivity-enhancing technology
may cause a “creative destruction” of the value of old technology firms. Thus, a
change in productivity growth can have conflicting effects on the valuations of old
and new firms. 
Major regime changes in monetary and fiscal policy can also exert a longer-term
influence on asset prices. For instance, lower corporate income taxes can raise 
equity values, and encourage investment and innovation. Deregulation can harm the
equity values of previously protected firms even as it creates new opportunities for
value creation elsewhere in the economy. Lower inflation reduces effective taxes 
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4. Barsky and De Long (1993) discuss the effect on equity prices of changes in the trend growth of earnings. The
required rate of return is constant in their analysis, as might be reasonable for an open economy. For a closed
economy, it would be important to take into account the effect of changes in trend growth on the real rate of
interest. See Kiley (2000).on capital income if tax rates are not fully indexed. Establishing full credibility 
for low inflation may enable an economy to operate at a lower unemployment 
rate, and thereby raise the marginal product of existing forms of capital. An end 
to go-stop monetary policy and the cyclical volatility that goes with it may even
reduce the demand for liquid assets in the economy. The subsequent rebalancing 
of portfolios will cause the prices of less liquid assets to rise relative to the prices of
liquid assets. 
Ultimately, asset price movements may be transitory even if the underlying secular
changes are permanent. Producible assets such as human, physical, or organizational
capital will be built up over time in response to increases in the prices or returns on
existing capital. All or part of an initial asset price rise may be reversed over time as
capital is built up, adding to the potential for volatility. Asset prices can be particu-
larly volatile when secular factors such as trend productivity growth are in play.
Volatility may be an inevitable consequence of the fact that it is difficult to predict
the future. Even volatile asset prices that reflect relative value help the economy to
allocate scarce resources to their most valued uses. 
C. The Influence of Liquidity on Asset Prices
This section describes and distinguishes between narrow liquidity, broad liquidity,
and market liquidity. Liquidity is central to the issues at hand for two reasons. 
First, liquidity has the potential to influence asset prices enormously. Second, to 
a large extent monetary policy exerts its leverage by influencing liquidity in the three
senses above. The discussion of liquidity is the foundation for the analysis of the 
relationship between monetary policy, deflation, and financial instability presented 
in Chapters III and IV of the paper. 
1. Narrow liquidity
Narrow liquidity is a service yield provided by the medium of exchange that 
allows the public to economize on “shopping time” in transactions. A central bank
manages the aggregate supply of the medium of exchange through its control of the
monetary base (bank reserves and currency). At any point in time, the public’s
demand for narrow liquidity services, and the derived stock demand for the real
medium of exchange, depends on the interest opportunity cost of money and 
the scale of monetary transactions that the public wishes to undertake. In practice, 
a central bank such as the Federal Reserve provides the monetary base so as to 
manage a short-term nominal interest rate over time. The Fed supports its short-
term nominal interest rate target by accommodating the public’s demand for 
narrow liquidity services at the short rate that reflects the current desired stance of 
monetary policy.
If inflation and inflation expectations are reasonably well anchored, then a central
bank can manage aggregate demand by manipulating nominal and real short-term
interest rates. In practice, then, management of the medium of exchange influences
asset prices in two ways. First, there is the direct influence through the leverage that
current and expected future nominal short rates exert on longer-term nominal rates
according to the expectations theory of the term structure. Longer-term interest rates,
in turn, influence the present discounted value of future asset returns. Second, there
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inflation, employment, and earnings over the business cycle.
5
2. Broad liquidity 
Liquidity defined broadly is a service yield provided by assets according to how easily
they can be turned into cash, either by sale or by serving as collateral for external
finance. Broad liquidity services are valued because they can be used to minimize the
exposure of households and firms to the external finance premium.
6 The premium is
a consequence of imperfect information and the costly enforcement of contracts that
create a wedge between the cost of funds raised externally and internally generated
funds. In other words, the premium reflects the deadweight costs associated with the
principal-agent problem that typically exists between lenders and borrowers. All
assets provide broad liquidity to one degree or another. Generally speaking, implicit
broad liquidity services contribute to any asset’s value together with direct utility,
monetary, or productive returns.
The existence of an external finance premium gives rise to an inventory demand
for assets that yield broad liquidity services. An inventory of assets held for their
implicit broad liquidity yield is variously referred to as precautionary savings, a buffer
stock, or self-insurance.
7 Precautionary savings or retained earnings help households
to smooth consumption and firms to take advantage of profitable investment 
opportunities. Liquid buffer stocks help entities to protect themselves from internally
generated financial distress, and to ride out or profit from a temporary destruction of
market liquidity that shuts off external finance or precludes selling other assets.
8
Broad liquidity is held in the form of monetary assets such as currency and bank
deposits. It is also held in the form of securities and relatively illiquid real assets. Even
assets not easily sold can serve as collateral for borrowing and so should be considered
to be a potential source of broad liquidity services, at least from the perspective of an
individual household or firm.
9
The external finance premium varies over the business cycle in a way that 
reinforces asset price movements. Consider a depressed economy. A collapse of asset
prices reduces collateral values, and thereby raises the external finance premium.
That, in turn, raises the implicit liquidity services yield on assets. To maintain capital
market equilibrium, explicit returns on liquid assets, e.g., short-term securities, must
fall relative to explicit returns on less liquid assets. If explicit nominal rates are already
near zero, then the required increase in the expected explicit yield spread between
illiquid and liquid assets must show up as an increase in the expected yield on 
relatively illiquid assets. Prices of illiquid assets must fall to produce the increase in
148 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001
5. See Goodfriend and King (1997) for a discussion of the role of monetary policy in a modern new synthesis 
macro model. 
6. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) discuss the nature of the external finance premium in detail.
7. Aiyagari (1994), Holmström and Tirole (1998), and Krusell and Smith (1998) analyze self-insurance in models
without money. Goodfriend (2000) discusses the role of broad liquidity in the transmission of monetary policy at
the zero bound on nominal interest rates. 
8. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) emphasize the role of financial capital to help firms profit from arbitrage in extreme
circumstances. 
9. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) analyze liquidation value and relate it to debt capacity, i.e., the degree to which an
asset provides broad liquidity services.expected returns required to equilibrate asset markets. The secondary asset price fall
causes net worth to fall and the external finance premium to rise further. Firms must
rely on retained earnings to rebuild net worth and to provide funds for investment.
Rebuilding net worth takes time, especially when earnings are low.
10 Thus, financial
factors amplify and propagate macroeconomic contractions over time. 
3. Market liquidity
Market liquidity refers to the ease with which an asset can be sold on short notice.
Consider the potential for market liquidity to influence security prices in terms of
firms that stand ready to make a market in securities. Free entry and competition in
market making implies an inverse relation between trading volume and transactions
cost. The reason is that volume enables market makers to cover overhead costs with
lower fees per transaction. Market liquidity is potentially fragile.
11 A sharp fall in
security prices due to pessimism about future returns has the potential to trigger a
collapse of market liquidity that amplifies the initial price fall. The amplification
mechanism works like this. A decline in security prices shrinks the net worth of 
market makers, who finance the bulk of their securities inventories with debt. That
elevates the external finance premium on the loans used by market makers to finance
their portfolios. Market makers may raise transaction fees to cover their higher
financing costs and to recapitalize themselves with retained earnings. The problem is
that higher fees have the potential to cause trading volume to fall off, necessitating
still higher fees, with the potential for a collapse of market liquidity.
12
Given the total expected return required to hold a security, the drying up of 
its market liquidity requires a security price to fall to the point where the higher
expected explicit return offsets the former implicit liquidity services yield.
Anticipating this possibility, market participants might attempt to sell the security on
the initial news, making a collapse of its market liquidity more likely. If a liquidity
crisis spreads into financial markets more generally, it will create more serious 
problems for firms and households. A generalized collapse of liquidity in financial
markets creates doubt about the ability of firms to roll over their liquid debt, 
and thereby calls the creditworthiness of firms into question.
13 Credit spreads rise,
compounding the liquidity crisis by cutting households and firms off from credit
markets. In addition, even if market liquidity does not collapse completely, the ability
of firms to realize cash by selling securities is limited by the collapse in their market
value. In this way, a collapse of market liquidity has the potential to trigger a rise 
in the external finance premium and a rise in the demand for liquid assets with 
additional contractionary consequences for the economy. 
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10. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) model the dynamic interaction between credit limits and the prices of assets that
serve as collateral for borrowing.
11. Descriptions of liquidity crises are found in Committee on the Global Financial System (1999), Group of Ten
(1996), and International Monetary Fund (1998, 1999a). 
12. Securities whose market liquidity had deteriorated could still serve as collateral for external finance; and they
could still provide broad liquidity services to some extent. 
13. Morris and Shin (1999) analyze theoretically and quantitatively the effect of liquidity risk on the price of 
corporate debt.D. Financial Distress
Financial distress is an important aspect of financial instability. Falling asset prices
and financial distress can be mutually reinforcing, as the liquidity crisis discussed
above makes clear. In order to understand the nature and consequences of financial
distress more fully, this section reviews the relationship between financial structure
and firm value. The ideas are employed to explain the collapse of the U.S. S&L
industry. The logic of financial distress is utilized again in connection with deflation
and stagnation in Chapter IV. 
1. Financial structure and firm value
14
Funding a firm with outside equity is costly because it reduces the manager’s incen-
tive to maximize the value of a firm’s assets. The manager is tempted to spend too
much on perks because he bears only part of the cost. The manager will be more
interested than shareholders in the growth and longevity of the company. Rarely is a
manager wealthy enough to finance his firm himself. But even when this is possible,
the firm may then be too cautious in making investments that would be desirable if
the risk could be diversified.
Issuing debt is the main alternative to self-financing or issuing outside equity. 
The advantage of debt relative to equity is that it allows owner-managers to retain
earnings above and beyond interest on the debt. Thus, debt overcomes the agency
costs associated with equity. However, debt is costly because it gives rise to conflicts
between equity interests and creditors. The use of debt creates an “asset substitution”
problem. Equity interests have an incentive to take on excessively risky projects or to
screen projects too lightly. This is because equity interests enjoy the returns if the
projects do well, but the creditors suffer the losses if the projects do poorly.
Recognizing the problem, lenders can refuse to lend or require a higher interest rate,
so that the expected cost of inefficient business decisions falls on equity interests.
Thus, borrowers have an incentive to commit not to take on excessively risky 
projects. Borrowers agree to abide by covenants in debt contracts to limit risk taking.
Covenants are costly, however, because they limit the discretion of management to
make value-maximizing investments, and creditors must monitor covenants. 
Debt also has costs associated with the “debt overhang” problem.
15 This problem
exists to some extent whenever a firm’s outstanding debt is at some risk of default and
covenants give current debt priority for repayment. In this case, a portion of value 
created by new investments will go not to the equity interests of a firm, but to credi-
tors through a reduced risk of default on currently outstanding debt. The problem
becomes particularly severe when the probability of debt default is very high. Equity
interests are most likely to forgo value-maximizing investments in such circumstances,
because the returns will go mainly or exclusively to rehabilitate outstanding debt. 
Bankruptcy is another cost of debt. There are legal and administrative costs; and
influence costs are incurred as the claimants to the firm’s assets try to protect their
claims.
16 Equity interests have little incentive to run a bankrupt firm efficiently, and
creditors may have insufficient knowledge of how to run the firm. Consequently,
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14. See Milgrom and Roberts (1992), chapter 15, for a general overview of related issues. 
15. See Myers (1977). 
16. Bankruptcy is discussed in Cornelli and Felli (1995) and in International Monetary Fund (1999c).firm assets and overall value are easily dissipated in bankruptcy. Even the likelihood
of bankruptcy may cause equity interests to take on excessively risky projects for 
reasons analogous to those mentioned above. Where a long-term customer relation-
ship is efficient, the prospect of bankruptcy will cost the firm its customers and help
force the firm into bankruptcy. If the claimants can’t agree on how to resolve their
claims, additional costs are incurred if a firm is liquidated at a loss relative to its going
concern value.
In order to avoid bankruptcy costs, informal debt workouts occur in which the
firm and its creditors bargain over rescheduling debt payments. Workouts are more
difficult for widely held debt. On the other hand, when debt is concentrated in a 
few creditors the opportunity for renegotiation exacerbates the asset substitution
problem. A debt-overhang problem can be eliminated if lenders can be persuaded to
make concessions, perhaps in exchange for equity. If the going-concern value is high
enough, a workout might involve recapitalizing the firm. Recapitalization would be
efficient if the restoration of an efficient mix of equity and debt creates enough value
to generate the return required by new investors.
2. The collapse of the U.S. S&L industry
17
The story of the collapse of the U.S. S&L industry in the 1980s illustrates nicely
some of the consequences of financial distress sketched above. Ultimately, the 
collapse cost the U.S. taxpayer about US$130 billion in transfers to make good on
the federal deposit insurance guarantee.
18 In addition, there were untold social costs
due to misallocated and wasted investment financed by S&Ls. The overbuilding that
occurred took years to work off, contributing to macroeconomic instability. The
S&L story illustrates how the incentive effects of financial distress interacted with the
deposit insurance guarantee, inflation, and disinflationary monetary policy to create 
a serious banking problem. 
S&Ls financed themselves with deposits and other short-term instruments and
held long-term mortgages. As inflation rose in the 1970s the inflation premium in
nominal interest rates rose. S&Ls paid higher short-term interest for their loanable
funds. Previously booked long-term mortgages paid the lower interest prevailing in
earlier years. Newly booked mortgages paid higher interest. But in the early 1980s
monetary policy was tightened to bring inflation down, and short rates moved far
above long rates. New mortgage bookings slowed during the accompanying recession
and there was an increase in defaults. For all these reasons, the S&L industry suffered
a prolonged period of negative cash flows. Inflation stabilized at around 4 percent in
1983, the recession ended, the yield curve became upward sloping, and S&Ls became
profitable again. By then, however, the period of negative cash flows had depleted the
book value capital of a large number of S&Ls. 
It is estimated that in 1985 all the S&Ls that were book insolvent could have
been closed and depositors paid off with an infusion of only around US$20 billion.
19
In other words, ultimately over US$100 billion of taxpayer transfers to resolve the
S&L industry appears to have resulted from regulatory forbearance. Forbearance was
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17. See Kane (1989) for a discussion and analysis.
18. See General Accounting Office (1996), p. 13.
19. See Dotsey and Kuprianov (1990), p. 15.initially decided upon because the S&L insurance fund was overwhelmed and
Congress would not appropriate the US$20 billion. So S&Ls with low or negative
book value net worth were allowed to continue operating. The hope was that deregu-
lation of the assets that they could buy, and growth, would generate enough internal
cash flow to recapitalize the S&Ls over time. Instead, as predicted by the analysis of
financial structure above, S&Ls engaged in asset substitution. S&Ls could get insured
deposits freely; they did not have to pay much of a risk premium. Since many S&Ls
had little or none of their own funds at stake, they increased the riskiness of their
portfolios, screened loans less carefully, and engaged in outright fraud.
20 Moreover,
once S&L owners judged that forbearance would last a while, competition to exploit
the situation caused otherwise conservative S&Ls to follow suit or lose market share. 
The debt-overhang problem played a part in the forbearance. Owners of S&Ls
had little incentive to recapitalize their institutions if additional capital mainly 
helped to back deposits and reduce the deposit insurance liability. In this case,
deposit insurance played the role of debt in creating an overhang problem. 
Hence, new capital was not forthcoming. In retrospect, a workout should have been
arranged in 1985 or sooner in which taxpayers could have contributed US$20 billion
or so to make good on the deposit guarantee in exchange for closing or merging 
nonviable S&Ls. 
One reason for the lengthy forbearance was that the public was reluctant to
appropriate the funds. In addition, the beneficiaries of forbearance could lobby
Congress to block the appropriation of public funds. In effect, funds to lobby
Congress came from inappropriate lending or outright looting, and ultimately from
taxpayers who would back the deposit insurance guarantee.
21 It helped that the 
general public and the media did not understand how all this worked.
22
Of course, banking crises can result from shocks other than inflation and disinfla-
tion. And the consequences can differ depending on the strength of regulation. For
instance, banking systems can have their net worth depleted in other ways. Real
estate and other collateral values can collapse after a boom-bust cycle. Deregulation
of the financial industry can destroy franchise value in banking.
23 If bank regulation is
weak, then financial distress can lead to forbearance as in the S&L crisis. However, if
regulation is effective, so that taxpayers stand ready to appropriate funds to close
insolvent institutions promptly and to help recapitalize viable ones, then financial
distress can manifest itself in a credit crunch, rather than with go-for-broke lending
and looting. Responsible behavior among financial institutions can be made to 
predominate. In an effort to rebuild capital, financial intermediaries will raise loan
rates, cut deposit rates, and screen loans more carefully. There will be less use of 
public funds and less inappropriate lending when regulations are strict and credible.
Financial distress will be costly, because intermediation costs increase temporarily as
the industry recapitalizes itself. But the magnitude and overall cost of any banking
system distress should be reduced. These points will be revisited in Chapter IV. 
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20. See Marshall and Prescott (2000).
21. Garcia (1999) surveys actual and best practices in the provision of deposit insurance around the world. 
22. Akerlof and Romer (1993) present a theoretical and empirical analysis of looting in the S&L industry.
23. On this point, see Keeley (1990).III. Monetary Policy and Asset Price Fluctuations
Chapter III develops two points about the influence of asset markets on monetary
policy. First, equity prices can be a highly misleading guide for interest rate policy
actions over the business cycle.
24 Second, many features of the tactical implementa-
tion of monetary policy should be understood to reflect a central bank’s desire to 
protect market liquidity while maximizing its leverage over longer-term interest rates
and aggregate demand.
25
A. Interest Rate Policy and Equity Prices
Consider two scenarios that might describe the end of a business expansion in which
the central bank was not sufficiently preemptive. First, an inflation scare could send
long-bond rates up and raise the prospect that a monetary tightening will precipitate
a recession. Equity prices will fall on such news. Nevertheless, the central bank
should follow through with higher short-term real interest rates to hold the line on
inflation. As discussed in Chapter II, this is what happened in the stop phase of the
go-stop policy cycle in the years before inflation was brought under control. 
Alternatively, the central bank’s credibility for low inflation might remain intact.
The business expansion could eventually tighten labor markets so much that a rise in
unit labor costs squeezes firm profits. The profit squeeze could precipitate a fall in
equity prices. Again, tighter interest rate policy might be necessary anyway to head
off inflation. In this case, however, the decline in firm cash flow, the fall in collateral
values, and the less favorable equity cost of capital could slow aggregate demand and
obviate the need for higher short rates. The proper direction for interest rate policy
would depend on the details of underlying macroeconomic conditions. In neither of
these two cases can the appropriate response of interest rate policy be read from the
direction of equity prices.
As a third example, consider rising structural productivity growth. Increased pro-
ductivity growth leads households and firms to borrow against their improved future
income prospects. At initial interest rates, aggregate demand accelerates in excess of
current potential output, causing employment to grow in excess of the sustainable
long-run trend. Labor markets tighten, and wages grow faster. Yet as long as produc-
tivity growth continues to rise, unit labor costs may remain stable or even fall. In
other words, firms may be able to finance rising wages out of rising productivity with
room to spare. Consequently, inflation pressures may take time to build up. Hence,
the central bank may put off raising real short-term interest rates, in spite of the fact
that equity values may be rising to reflect accelerating firm profits. 
Once productivity growth stops rising, ongoing competition for workers in tight
labor markets will cause compensation to catch up to the higher productivity growth
path. Real wages must grow faster than productivity growth, and firm profits must
grow more slowly during this transition period. The slowdown in profit growth will
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24. See Bernanke and Gertler (2000), Bank for International Settlements (1998), Cecchetti et al. (forthcoming),
Fuhrer and Moore (1992), and Smets (1997) for quantitative model-based analyses of this issue, and Gertler 
et al. (1998) and Goodhart (1995) for other points of view. 
25. Goodfriend (1998) discusses related issues. slow the rise in equity prices, or cause them to fall.
26 By that time, however, inflation
may be more of a threat than before. Labor markets will be tighter, and firms will 
find it more difficult to finance further growth in nominal wages out of rising 
productivity. To control inflation, the central bank may have to go ahead and raise
short-term interest rates regardless of the behavior of equity prices. 
The three scenarios sketched above illustrate why equity prices can be a highly
misleading guide for interest rate policy.
B. The Tactics of Interest Rate Policy and Market Liquidity
The maintenance of liquidity in financial markets is a primary concern of central
banks for two reasons. A collapse of market liquidity can have adverse consequences
for asset markets and the economy. Moreover, central banks rely on liquid markets 
to transmit interest rate policy actions to the economy. This section outlines how
monetary policy operating procedures enable central banks to support liquidity in
financial markets while maximizing leverage over longer-term interest rates and
aggregate demand. 
Central banks can use either a quantitative policy instrument (bank reserves or
the monetary base) or an interest rate instrument (the overnight interbank rate) to
implement monetary policy. Central bankers generally prefer to use an interest 
rate instrument, because it automatically smooths short-term interest rates against
short-run shifts in the demand for currency and bank reserves. Thus, the supply 
of currency and bank reserves always equals the demand at the intended level of
short-term interest rates. In particular, a sudden surge in the demand for currency
and bank reserves during a financial crisis is automatically accommodated at the
interbank interest rate target. 
However, aggregate demand does not respond directly to overnight rates but only
to longer-term rates. Hence, central banks target overnight rates with the aim of
managing longer-term interest rates. Leverage over longer-term rates is exercised as
follows. The market determines longer-term rates as an average of the expected
overnight rate over the relevant horizon (with allowance for default risk, and a term
or liquidity spread). Consider the pricing of a six-month bank loan. A bank could
fund the loan with a six-month certificate of deposit (CD), or it could plan to bor-
row overnight for the next six months. Cost minimization and competition among
banks keep CD rates in line with the average expected future overnight rate for a
comparable horizon; and competition in loan markets links loan rates to CD rates.
Finally, arbitrage links other money market rates to CD rates of similar maturity. 
Central bankers prefer to influence longer-term market rates with a minimum of
volatility of the overnight interbank rate in order to protect market liquidity further.
This is partly because sudden interest rate spikes can threaten liquidity in asset 
markets; and because nominal interest rates cannot go below the zero bound.
Changes in the overnight rate are highly persistent and seldom quickly reversed, so
that a change in the overnight target rate carries expected future overnight rates with
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26. Kiley (2000) points out that in a production economy with an endogenous interest rate faster productivity
growth ultimately lowers the ratio of the market value of firms to output along the new balanced growth path.it and thus longer-term money market rates too. This way, a central bank anchors the
short end of the term structure of interest rates to the intended overnight rate and
influences longer-term rates with a minimum of volatility in short rates. 
Such reasoning explains two tactical principles of interest rate policy. First, the
interbank rate target is changed only when a near-term reversal is relatively unlikely
to be desirable ex post. Second, a central bank is usually inclined to stick with a 
target change for a period of time, even if subsequent events suggest that the target
change should be reversed quickly. In other words, one observes a degree of inertia in
a central bank’s interest rate policy instrument.
27
To strengthen its leverage over longer-term rates (with a minimum of volatility in
short rates), a central bank accompanies interest rate target changes with discount
(lombard) rate changes, and verbal statements. For instance, longer-term rates in the
United States rise more for a given increase in the federal funds rate when the 
discount rate is raised together with the funds rate.
28 When the Fed wishes to signal
that it has reached the top of a sequence of increases in the funds rate, it can make 
a move without increasing the discount rate. On the other hand, when the Fed 
reinforces a funds rate target change with a discount rate action, it signals that the
target change is likely to persist and that rates are likely to go higher still. 
Announcements or discount rate changes also allow a central bank to signal the
intensity of its concerns about the economy. Raising the discount rate together with
the interbank rate can help anchor inflation expectations and reduce the likelihood
that workers and firms will demand inflationary wage and price increases. On the
other hand, lowering the discount rate together with the interbank rate can help to
boost consumer and business confidence and preempt an inclination to cut back 
on spending and production. Quieter policy actions are called for when a central
bank is more relaxed about current economic conditions. A “one-two punch” that
changes both the interbank rate and the discount rate can be counterproductive if it
causes the public to believe that the central bank is more worried about inflation or
recession than is the case. 
Communication is particularly important to help stabilize securities markets after
a financial shock. As described in Chapter II, a break in equity prices or a significant
default in credit markets can destroy market liquidity. A central bank needs to 
take action to counteract that process. Signals that convey a commitment to stabilize
markets help to do that.
Because the provision of bank reserves and currency occurs automatically at 
the central bank’s interest rate target, it contains no signal of a central bank’s commit-
ment to support markets. A small drop in the interbank rate target taken relatively
quickly sends a signal of the central bank’s concern, especially if accompanied by a
cut in the discount rate and a statement of concern. The cut in short rates helps to
stabilize asset prices directly by pulling down longer-term rates, and indirectly by
stimulating aggregate demand. The rate cut also demonstrates the central bank’s
commitment to do more if necessary. A rate cut is not without risks, however,
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27. Woodford (1999) develops this point in a theoretical model of monetary policy. 
28. Cook and Hahn (1988) demonstrate this effect empirically.because the central bank must be prepared to let it stand for awhile for the 
reasons mentioned above, even if markets bounce back relatively quickly. This
increases the chances of an outbreak of inflation if the economy is already at risk 
of higher inflation.
29
If a collapse of lending threatens to widen and deepen a liquidity crisis, the central
bank can utilize its discount window. It could announce its intention to lend 
relatively freely on reasonable collateral to depository institutions that do not call in
their loans, especially to market makers. Again, an announcement would establish a
commitment that could encourage market confidence. Central bank lending would
not undermine its interest rate target if financed by selling Treasury securities. 
The central bank’s lending commitment can be effective against an incipient 
collapse of market liquidity by relieving financial distress all around, especially on
market makers. Most importantly, lending can buy time to help the market redis-
tribute liquidity, and shift risky positions to entities positioned to carry them in
return for considerable short-term financial gain. However, extending the central
bank’s lending commitment is not without risk. Excessive central bank support of
market liquidity would cause banks, market makers, and other beneficiaries of central
bank lending to take less care to self-insure themselves against financial distress.
Enforcing prudential standards on banks and market makers would help to deter
moral hazard. A central bank should limit its lending so that moral hazard does not
increase risk in asset markets over time.
30
IV. Deflation and Stagnation
Chapter IV addresses the roots of deflation and the forces that put a potentially 
deflationary economy at risk of stagnation. In so doing, it suggests how monetary
policy might contribute to asset price volatility even in an era of price level stability.
31
Asset prices play an important role in amplifying and propagating shocks, but they
are a conduit rather than a source of deflationary forces. The analysis identifies 
monetary policy as a fundamental source of deflation and stagnation risk. There are
two problems for monetary policy that put an economy at risk of deflation and 
stagnation when inflation is low. First, a central bank can be fooled by its own 
credibility for low inflation into being insufficiently preemptive in a business 
expansion. Allowing a boom to go on too long creates the conditions for a bust and 
a recession after that. Second, although the economy may need low or negative 
short-term interest rates to stimulate aggregate demand subsequently, interest rate
policy can be immobilized at the zero bound on nominal interest rates. 
The discussion begins by pointing out the potential for deflation and stagnation
that exists when the central bank has full credibility for low inflation. Then it
addresses the power of monetary policy, fiscal policy, and banking policy to act
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29. Easy monetary policy in the aftermath of the October 1987 stock market break probably contributed to rising
U.S. inflation in the late 1980s.
30. Goodfriend and Lacker (1999) discuss at length how to deal with this problem.
31. See Shiller (1993, 2000).against deflation and stagnation at the zero bound on interest rates. The policy 
discussion indicates how the chain of events that potentially leads to stagnation can
be weakened or broken at a number of places. 
A. The Potential for Deflation and Stagnation
The public’s confidence that the price level will remain stable creates the potential for
boom-bust cycles that manifest themselves primarily in fluctuations of asset 
prices and real quantities (employment, production, consumption, and investment)
and less in price level instability. If expectations of inflation are firmly anchored,
labor markets might get surprisingly tight without triggering inflationary wage 
pressures. Firms might be inclined to hold the line on price increases even if labor
costs begin to rise.
32 Early warning indicators of inflation might not work very well.
For instance, inflation expectations in long-bond rates might be firmly anchored in
spite of potentially inflationary resource utilization. 
Hence, a central bank might be inclined to delay monetary tightening when the
economy moves above a presumed level of non-inflationary potential output. The
timing and magnitude of interest rate policy actions are difficult to determine in any
case. Preemptive interest rate policy actions are difficult to justify to the public when
there is little evidence of inflationary pressure. A kind of wishful thinking can
develop. The public might come to believe that the economy has become less prone
to inflation, regardless of what the central bank does. Such optimism could support a
boom in spending by households and firms, especially if the central bank exhibits a
reluctance to raise short-term interest rates. The plausibly persistent increase in the
economy’s non-inflationary productive potential would be reflected in a run-up in
equity, real estate, and other asset prices. 
If, however, the economy continued to operate significantly above potential, then
at some point the credibility for stable prices would self-destruct. Tightness in labor
and product markets would trigger a jump in inflation, and the central bank would
react with tighter monetary policy. In effect, the outbreak of inflation would destroy
an implicit reputational equilibrium in which wage and price setters kept their part
of an implicit bargain by not inflating as long as the central bank was expected to
support its commitment to price stability. 
An unsustainable boom is apt to collapse relatively quickly. Once significant 
inflation occurs, the mutual confidence among wage earners, price setters, and the
central bank will deteriorate rapidly.
33 There is the potential for a sharp downgrading
of future income prospects, involving a sharp break in asset prices and a substantial
fall in aggregate demand. 
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32. Taylor (2000) notes that recently there has been a significant decline in the degree to which firms pass through
changes in costs to prices, a decline frequently regarded as a reduction of the pricing power of firms. Taylor’s
sticky-price model suggests that low inflation itself (in particular, low expectations of inflation) causes the low
pass-through. The main point of Taylor’s paper is that low pass-through should not be taken as exogenous to the
inflationary environment. He points out that the tendency for pass-through to stay low in the face of strong
growth in demand would disappear if the public lost confidence in the central bank’s resolve to tighten monetary
policy sufficiently to validate low inflation. See Goodfriend and King (1997), section 8.2.2, pp. 274–275.
33. The collapse of the Japanese boom in the early 1990s is consistent with this view. See Goodfriend’s comment on
Ueda (1997).The combination of open inflation, a collapse in asset prices, and declining real
economic activity puts the central bank in a difficult situation. On one hand, the
central bank may be inclined to raise real short-term interest rates to restore its 
credibility for low inflation. However, the need for tighter policy might be short-
lived. The heavy investment during the boom will look excessive in light of subse-
quent developments. A capital-good overhang may cause investment in producer and
consumer durables to be weak for some time to come.
34 Moreover, the collapse in
asset prices will impair balance sheets and widen the external finance premium, with
additional contractionary implications. The central bank’s predicament is made
worse by the zero bound on nominal interest rates. 
The immobilization of interest rate policy at the zero bound will create doubt
about whether monetary policy can act against the deficiency of aggregate demand.
Households and firms will be inclined to save more as interest rates near zero, 
worsening the contractionary pressure. A lack of confidence in stabilization policy
will be reflected in excessively depressed asset prices. 
Note the role of asset prices in the boom-bust cycle. Prices of assets such as equity
and real estate would exhibit considerable volatility, reflecting the wide range of 
variation in expected future income prospects. Asset price movements, in turn, would
reinforce cyclical volatility by reducing the external finance premium in the boom
and raising it in the bust part of the cycle. Asset price volatility, however, should be
regarded as a symptom and not a cause of the boom-bust cycle. Rather than focusing
on asset prices, central bankers should address the problems for monetary policy that
give rise to the potential for economic instability. 
A full analysis of interest rate policy is beyond the scope of this paper. One thing
is certain, there are no good options when an unsustainable boom turns to bust. 
A central bank should make every effort not to be fooled in the first place into 
being insufficiently preemptive during an economic expansion. To guard against this
possibility, a central bank should benchmark its policy actions against a rule that has
performed reasonably well in the past.
35 A central bank should also position itself to
overcome the zero bound on interest rate policy. 
B. Monetary Policy at the Zero Bound on Interest Rates
36
With fully credible price level stability, nominal short-term interest rates could 
average as low as 1 or 2 percent per annum. This leaves relatively little leeway for
interest rates to fall in a recession to stimulate aggregate demand. Thus, the zero
bound on nominal interest rates is a potential problem for monetary policy when
inflation is low and stable. The zero bound is a consequence of the fact that no one
will lend money at negative nominal interest if cash is costless to carry over time. 
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34. This point is made, for instance, in International Monetary Fund (1999b).
35. See Taylor (1999). Orphanides (1998) emphasizes that measuring the output gap in real time is very difficult.
His work suggests that central banks should downgrade the response of the interest rate to the output gap in the
policy rule and respond mainly to inflation. The argument in this paper suggests that, with credible price stabil-
ity, responding only to inflation has problems of its own. Central banks need to respond to real measures of 
inflationary potential so as not to be insufficiently preemptive in a business expansion. 
36. This subsection borrows from Goodfriend (2000); see also McCallum (2000). See Fujiki et al. (2001) for a
closely related discussion and analysis of the Bank of Japan’s zero interest policy.In particular, the nominal interbank interest rate will not fall below zero, because 
central banks store electronic bank reserves for free. Once a central bank has lowered
its interbank interest rate policy instrument to zero, conventional interest rate policy
is immobilized. Moreover, an expansionary open market purchase cannot relax the
transaction constraint any further to free “shopping time” for more productive uses.
At that point, the economy may be said to be satiated in narrow liquidity services 
provided by the medium of exchange. 
Nevertheless, there are two mechanisms by which monetary policy can continue
to stimulate spending when the interbank rate is at the cost-of-carry floor. First, 
open market purchases can stimulate spending because money also provides broad 
liquidity services, and these will generally not be satiated when the nominal interest
rate is at the zero bound. A central bank can increase broad liquidity by buying 
relatively illiquid assets, such as long-term bonds. Second, a central bank can put 
in place systems to impose a carry tax on electronic bank reserves. Open market 
purchases could then push the interbank rate below zero by the cost of carry. A carry
tax could be imposed on currency and vault cash to provide more leeway to push
nominal interest rates below zero. 
1. Quantitative monetary policy at the zero bound
The transmission mechanism by which broad liquidity stimulates spending at the
zero bound involves the portfolio-rebalancing channel identified by monetarists and
the credit channel by which a monetary expansion reduces the external finance 
premium.
37 These two channels are thoroughly intertwined, since broad liquidity 
services are closely related to the external finance premium. It is plausible to think
that the implicit marginal broad liquidity services yield (given, income, consumption,
and wealth) declines as the aggregate stock of monetary assets increases. This would
be so because the greater abundance of liquidity reduces the exposure of households
and firms to the external finance premium. 
A monetary expansion that reduces the implicit marginal services yield on 
monetary assets causes the public to rebalance its portfolio by acquiring assets 
yielding direct utility, money, or productive services. Portfolio balance is restored
when the prices of the latter rise enough so that their expected returns have fallen as
much as the implicit liquidity yield on monetary assets. Higher asset prices stimulate
spending by raising wealth and by increasing the return to the production of 
producer and consumer durable goods. 
From the credit channel point of view, a reduction in the external finance 
premium is achieved both by the increase in monetary liquidity and by the rise in
asset prices. Balance sheets improve. Collateral values improve, net worth increases 
in nonfinancial firms and in the banking system. Consequently, bank lending is 
stimulated and credit spreads narrow. Spending increases all around, because the cost
of borrowing against future income prospects falls. Thus, aggressive open market
operations have the power to stimulate spending even when nominal interest rates 
are at the zero bound. 
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37. See Meltzer (1995) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995).There are complications. Ordinarily, a relatively small change in bank reserves is
sufficient to support a change in the central bank’s interest rate policy instrument.
However, monetary policy actions that must stimulate spending through their 
effect on broad liquidity may require much larger injections of monetary base. For
quantitative monetary policy to be effective at the zero bound, the central bank must
be prepared to engage in open market purchases that increase the size of its balance
sheet considerably. Moreover, in order to increase monetary assets providing broad
liquidity significantly, a central bank would have to acquire relatively illiquid assets
such as long-term bonds, which are subject to interest rate risk. 
Quantitative monetary policy at the zero bound is likely to be effective only if the
public believes that the central bank will do whatever it takes, and that the monetary
stimulus will not be withdrawn before the economy recovers. Such a commitment
would expose a central bank to the risk of capital loss on its long bonds due to 
uncertainty about the timing and magnitude of the rise in interest rates that would
accompany a recovery. If the public thinks that the central bank is unwilling to 
pursue quantitative policy aggressively for fear of capital losses, or for any other 
reason, then quantitative policy will lack credibility. To help assure the credibility of
quantitative monetary policy, the Treasury should indemnify the central bank against
capital losses. In order to guard against inflation, the Treasury should agree to provide
the central bank with enough securities to sell in order to drain excess money 
balances from the economy once prosperity has been restored. 
2. Imposing a carry tax on bank reserves and currency
If a central bank imposed a per period, per dollar carry tax on electronic bank
reserves when the interbank rate was pressed to zero by an abundance of reserves,
competition among banks to avoid the carry tax would push the interbank rate below
zero by the cost of carry. If negative rates were expected to persist for a while, 
however, banks and the public would hoard currency rather than lend at negative
interest. To deal with this problem, a central bank could also impose a carry tax on
vault cash and currency in the hands of the public. Modern payments technology
makes it possible to impose a carry tax on currency by recording the date it leaves an
automatic teller machine and the date it is returned to a bank. For the most part, 
currency is spent and returned to the banking system by merchants a week or so after
it is withdrawn. Thus, the imposition of a carry tax on currency would be collected
like a sales tax. For instance, a carry tax on currency of 5 percent per year would be
sufficient to prevent hoarding as long as the interbank rate was not pushed farther
than 5 percent below zero.
By varying the carry tax on electronic bank reserves when needed, a negative
nominal interbank rate could be targeted as easily as a positive rate. The carry tax
would be a powerful supplement to quantitative policy. Systems to impose a carry tax
to fight deflation could be introduced to pay interest on bank reserves and currency
when nominal interest rates exceed zero. Carry interest could be introduced in
exchange for the opportunity to use the carry tax to overcome the zero bound on
interest rate policy if need be. By introducing the means to impose a carry tax, and
by getting the Treasury to support quantitative policy, a central bank could 
completely overcome the zero bound on interest rate policy. 
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The immobilization of monetary policy at the zero bound would create pressure to
use fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate demand. Unfortunately, fiscal policies are
likely to be costly, relatively ineffective at best, and counterproductive at worst. 
For the purpose of this discussion, it is useful to distinguish three types of fiscal 
policy: a debt-financed cut in taxes, debt-financed government investment in public
capital, and microeconomic interventions and regulations to support incomes in 
specific sectors.
A temporary debt-financed cut in taxes could have a positive effect on spending to
the extent that bonds are regarded as net wealth. On the other hand, if the public has
been sensitized to the problems of financing social security or banking system
bailouts, then the public may recognize that debt-financed tax cuts amount to
deferred and not reduced taxes. In that case, a cut in taxes financed by debt could
have a relatively small effect on aggregate demand. 
A debt-financed tax cut could increase spending by putting cash in the hands of
credit-constrained households and firms. Such entities would be better off even if
they had to pay their share of taxes to support interest on the increase in public debt.
The reason is that such a policy effectively would allow credit-constrained entities to
borrow at the government interest rate. Any benefits, however, would have to be
judged in the light of administrative and distortion costs of the change in tax rates,
and any perceived incremental burden of the public debt.
38
Debt-financed government investment in public capital would have a direct effect
on aggregate demand. If public capital were already overbuilt, however, then building
more could be a costly waste of real resources. Accelerating the construction of public
capital scheduled to be built in the future might be less wasteful. If a capital overhang
is part of the stabilization problem, however, then accelerating the construction of
public capital might simply extend the period over which the capital stock needs 
to be worked off.
39 Finally, debt issued to finance public capital creates future tax 
liabilities that could deter private investment at a time when investment is already
weak. Even the possibility of such tax liabilities could deter investment by increasing
uncertainty about the appropriability of returns. 
Perhaps the most dangerous fiscal policy response to economic stagnation is the
inclination to support the income of particular groups or sectors in the economy
with anti-competitive interventions and regulations. Such interventions transfer
income by distorting relative prices and markups. They amount to off-budget 
subsidies financed by higher prices for households and firms. They would be attrac-
tive, however, to a government whose debt to GDP ratio was already high due to on-
budget debt-financed fiscal initiatives. Protracted stagnation would increase the
demand for special favors and the willingness of politicians to supply them.
161
Financial Stability, Deflation, and Monetary Policy
38. Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) study the optimum quantity of government debt in a real business cycle model
with no aggregate uncertainty, but where there is individual uncertainty due to the absence of insurance markets.
Thus, there is precautionary saving in their model, and government debt provides broad liquidity services. 
39. This would be so to the extent that public capital is a substitute for private capital.The danger from such fiscal policy initiatives is this.
40 First, regulatory favors 
distributed to one group create a demand to help others. Second, off-budget taxes are
only imperfectly perceived. Third, the aggregate efficiency costs can be considerable.
Collectively, anti-competitive fiscal policies can have a significant negative effect on
potential output. The bottom line is that dispensing fiscal favors to particular groups
tends to breed stagnation. Even the possibility of the dispensation of such distortions
will depress aggregate income prospects, asset prices, and spending, and drive the
economy toward deflation and stagnation. 
D. Banking Policy and the Consequences of Financial Distress
The problem facing bank regulators in the aftermath of a boom-bust cycle is the large
increase in nonperforming loans on bank balance sheets.
41 In contrast to the S&L 
crisis, even before a period of forbearance begins, a significant bad-loan problem ties
up a large share of loanable funds. Ordinarily, bank owners have an incentive to write
off and resolve loans early in order to take control of collateral before it depreciates.
Financial distress blunts that incentive. A bank owner has no incentive to foreclose if
write-offs make the bank (book) insolvent, forcing regulators to seize the bank.
42
Regulators acting on behalf of taxpayers do have an incentive to take control of
insolvent banks. To do so, however, examiners must force banks to write down loans,
and the deposit insurer must have sufficient resources to fund the deposit guarantee.
Both hurdles are particularly difficult to overcome when there is widespread financial
distress. Moreover, loan valuations are highly subjective. Bank owners threatened
with a loss of control will challenge write-downs forced on them. 
Speedy appropriations might save taxpayers money in the long run, but appro-
priations are difficult to get, especially in a recession. As in the S&L crisis, there are
those who profit from a delayed resolution of banking problems, e.g., borrowers
whose loans are not foreclosed and bankers who retain control of bank assets. Such
beneficiaries have an incentive to use the gains from delayed resolution to lobby the
legislature not to appropriate funds for closing banks. Furthermore, taxpayers are 
naturally slow to recognize the need to transfer funds to close distressed banks. They
don’t understand the incentives for bank owners with little of their own funds at
stake to take on excessive risk and let collateral dissipate. There is a reluctance 
to authorize funds until the waste and fraud that result from forbearance become 
visible for all to see. 
If financial distress in banking were seen clearly to restrict the supply of credit, then
the public might agree to finance (with taxes) a more prompt resolution of insolvent
banks. But a stagnant economy might show little evidence of inadequate bank credit.
Moreover, at very low interest rates, significant nonperforming loans create less of a 
negative cash flow problem for banks. Consequently, forbearance is easier to sustain. 
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40. Kennedy (1999) describes Roosevelt’s New Deal policies in the 1930s as a collection of market interventions
taken to support favored sectors of the economy. Cole and Ohanian (1999) model these New Deal interventions
and show quantitatively that they can explain the persistence of the Great Depression in the United States.
41. See, for example, the discussion of the bad-loan problem in Ueda (2000). Hoshi and Kashyap (1999) cite deregu-
lation as an important cause of the banking problems in Japan. Kanaya and Woo (2000) present a particularly
good overview of Japanese banking problems and policy responses. 
42. Bank owners also have little incentive to set aside loan loss reserves. See Walter (1991).Society should take steps to protect itself from the costly forbearance that can
accompany financial distress in banking.
43 Bank supervision and regulation should 
be strengthened. Regulators should have the power to write down loans more 
aggressively.
44 And regulators should enforce minimum capital requirements.
45 The
deposit insurance fund should be enlarged to reduce the risk of having to ask the 
legislature for funds to close banks. In any case, funds should be appropriated
promptly, and used to resolve banks in a way that does not protect parties that have
benefited from misallocating bank loans.
46 The public should be made to understand
the nature and costliness of forbearance. Taking corrective action may restrict 
the supply of bank credit somewhat for a period of time.
47 But to do otherwise just
delays the necessary corrective action and incurs wasteful forbearance costs. Most
importantly, a lingering widespread financial distress in the banking system places a
greater burden on monetary policy at a time when the zero bound complicates the
central bank’s power to lower interest rates.
V. Summary
The paper explored the relationship between financial stability, deflation, and mone-
tary policy. A discussion of narrow liquidity, broad liquidity, and market liquidity
provided the foundation for the analysis. There was also a review of the consequences
of financial distress for asset price fluctuations and banking crises. Two initial con-
clusions were reached in light of these preliminaries. Equity prices are a misleading
guide for interest rate policy. Monetary policy tactics protect market liquidity 
while maximizing the central bank’s leverage over longer-term interest rates and
aggregate demand. 
The main point of the paper is that monetary policy is a fundamental source 
of deflation and stagnation risk when price level stability is fully credible. There are
two problems for monetary policy. A central bank can be fooled by its own credibility
for low inflation into being insufficiently preemptive in a business expansion.
Monetary policy might then be constrained by the zero bound on nominal rates 
from reducing real interest rates enough to avert deflation and stagnation in the 
subsequent contraction. 
The following steps should be taken to guard against this chain of events. First, a
central bank should be sufficiently preemptive in a boom. Second, a central bank
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43. There now exists a large literature on bank restructuring. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1997, 1998)
tells the story for the United States. Alexander et al. (1997), Bank for International Settlements (1999), Enoch 
et al. (1997, 1999), Lindgren et al. (1996), Nyberg (1997), and Sheng (1996) summarize international 
experience on bank restructuring and the consequences of unsound banking. 
44. Goodhart et al. (1998) discuss how this should be done. Their advice accords well with the recommendations in
this paper. 
45. Marshall and Prescott (2000) and Diamond and Rajan (1999) present useful ways to think about bank capital.
Merton and Perold (1993) present a framework for thinking about the cost of capital in financial firms. 
46. Whether insolvent banks should be closed, or recapitalized and allowed to remain open is often a difficult 
question. Diamond (2000) presents a theoretical discussion of the issue. The references in Footnote 43 discuss
practical restructuring options at length. 
47. Hogarth and Thomas (1999) find evidence that actions taken in 1998 to recapitalize and resolve insolvent
Japanese banks restricted the supply of bank credit relative to the demand.Aiyagari, S. Rao, “Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
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should prepare to undertake aggressive open market purchases at the zero bound.
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WILLIAM R. WHITE
Bank for International Settlements
This was a very enjoyable paper to read, but one that covered a very wide range 
of economic territory. Since it would be impossible to evaluate its content system-
atically, let me reorder Goodfriend’s contents with a view to addressing only two
questions. First, how does a country get itself into a deflationary situation? There will
be no surprise if I suggest that the answer can be succinctly expressed in two words:
“boom” and “bust.” Second, how does a country get itself out of a deflationary 
situation? With respect to each question, I will focus (albeit not exclusively) on
Goodfriend’s recommendations regarding monetary policy.
I. Getting into Deflation?
Goodfriend makes a simple but fundamental point concerning the problems that can
arise in the “boom” phase of an economic cycle. Justified optimism can turn into
excessive optimism; rational enthusiasm can turn into irrational exuberance. The
“good news” of low inflation can blind both policy makers and market participants to
emerging problems. In Mexico in 1994, economic crisis followed a period of high
consumption and rapid credit creation associated with welcome policies of fiscal
restraint, structural reform, and the privatization of banks. In Asia in 1997, the
promise of benefits arising from deregulation and globalization led to rapid credit
creation and unsustainable levels of investment. The experiences of the United States
in the 1920s and Japan in the 1980s are no less relevant. In all of these cases, low
inflation was not sufficient to prevent dangerous financial excesses from building up.
While I certainly agreed with Goodfriend’s conclusion that low inflation is no
panacea, he perhaps places too little emphasis on the deflationary dangers of rapid
asset price increases and the associated vulnerability of the financial system; indeed,
property prices are not mentioned at all in his paper. Goodfriend’s basic story, valid as
far as it goes, is rather one of “sticky” inflation (due to credibility effects) that finally
accelerates, leading to the need for a sharp monetary policy response. Recession 
follows and, with inflation initially low, deflation is the next step.
While Goodfriend’s narrative could be richer on the financial asset side, he does in
the early part of his paper put welcome emphasis on associated problems of liquidityin financial markets. He notes, for example, that when “narrow liquidity” rises, “broad
liquidity” rises too. I would interpret this statement as being consistent with what 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) publications have been saying for some
years.
48 That is, when monetary policy eases, credit and other risk spreads tend to 
narrow as a spirit of optimism begins to permeate the markets. In recent years, more-
over, this tendency for risk to be underpriced has been exacerbated by the growing
degree of competition in financial markets encouraged by the search for shareholder
value, on the one hand, and the provision of public safety nets, on the other.
Confronted with such tendencies in the “boom” period, how should monetary
policy react? Here I take issue with Goodfriend. He suggests (referring in a footnote
to the Taylor rule) that policy makers: 
should make every effort not to be fooled in the first place into being insufficiently
preemptive during an economic expansion. To guard against this possibility a 
central bank should benchmark its policy against a rule that has performed 
reasonably well in the past.
This seems to me to miss the basic point. We begin with the assumption 
that consumer price index (CPI) inflation is low, and normal rules would say 
there would be no need for a policy response. Yet, underlying this benign set of 
circumstances, there would nevertheless be a developing problem in the financial 
system that could threaten deflation if it were to materialize. 
That being said, Goodfriend is more than aware that a central bank can become
the victim of its own rhetoric. Having itself suggested that a low inflation rate is not
just necessary but also sufficient to ensure sustainable growth, how can a central bank
raise interest rates in the face of low CPI inflation? Indeed, the dilemma is made even
worse if one considers that moderate interest rate increases may not be sufficient to
deal with these financial excesses. Sharply higher rates to deal with a bubble, which
must be burst because it cannot be deflated, will have very little political support in 
a world conditioned to believe that “all is well.”
What is also missing from Goodfriend’s paper is the question of whether a central
bank ought to burst an asset price bubble. This question has a long history, and there
is clearly no right answer. On the one hand, it is tempting to say that a bubble should
be burst as soon as one knows it is a bubble. On the other hand, since such certainty
will come only very late in the day, a cynic might feel a better course would be for
policy makers to stay out of the way and simply let nature take its course. Indeed,
this response might also be recommended if the policy maker felt there would always
be some grounds for believing that observed prices could be justified in terms of
underlying fundamentals.
The “bust” phase of the cycle can also lead to policy conundrums. Goodfriend
rightly notes that the market dynamics evident in the upturn are likely to go sharply
into reverse. As the economy weakens, whether due to higher interest rates or the
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simple weight of past excesses, credit and liquidity spreads will widen. Goodfriend
emphasizes in the early part of his paper the impact of lower asset prices on net worth
and the attempt by affected market-makers to pass on their increased vulnerability in
the form of higher transaction costs. This might well happen. However, the effects of
margin calls in response to leverage, portfolio insurance, and a common response 
to shared risk management techniques (recommended to all by the supervisory
authorities) might play an even bigger role in contributing to large and potentially
disruptive price movements in financial markets. Markets do seem in recent years to
have become less atomistic and potentially more vulnerable to overshooting as
macroeconomic excesses resolve themselves.
Goodfriend’s assessment of the macroeconomic processes likely to be in play 
during the downturn also seems sound. They have a rather Austrian flavor in that he
emphasizes over-investment during the boom phase, the necessity for retrenchment
later, and the need to face up to the problems associated with declining asset values
but unchanged nominal liabilities. Indeed, using recent experience in the United
States as an example, one could easily identify even more causes for concern. The
heavy buyback of shares by established “old economy” firms has been accompanied
by a significant expansion of initial public offerings in “new economy” industries.
The capacity of actual rates of return to meet investors’ expectations remains to be
tested. Consumers have also invested heavily in such durable expenditures as cars and
houses, which makes further expenditures eminently postponable. And finally, the
widening current account deficit in the United States implies that other aspects of the
hangover from a boom will be a lower dollar, a negative terms-of-trade shock, and 
a further need to reduce domestic absorption. Together with all the financial strains
likely to emerge in the “bust” phase of such a cycle, these developments could pose 
a significant challenge to policy makers.
In such circumstances, I would contend that some policy reactions might clearly
be recommended but others are less clear-cut. On the one hand, lender of last 
resort facilities and emergency liquidity assistance should be available to institutions
that need them provided they meet appropriate criteria. A more difficult question 
is what to do about asset prices in a crisis. In general terms, it is of course clear 
that no attempt should be made by policy makers to maintain asset prices at some
predetermined level. I think most would agree that those in a capitalist system 
who have made errors of judgment should be made to pay the price of those 
misjudgments. But what is more complex is the issue of what central banks should
do in the specific circumstances of a collapse of prices due to a drying up of liquidity
in a particular market, perhaps even one of global importance. Should they act 
as a “market maker of last resort” or not? An even more important question is 
whether there should be a general reduction in interest rates in such circumstances.
Goodfriend seems to me to take an even-handed view. He recognizes that “hidden”
inflation can emerge as the economy turns down, presenting an unpleasant picture 
of stagflation. Indeed, if the external value of the currency were to decline sharply 
in the case of an economic slowdown, this stagflation problem might be sharply
accentuated. However, what receives less attention than it should in Goodfriend’s
analysis is the potentially different effects of monetary easing in different markets.For example, when the Federal Reserve rightly eased in the face of the liquidity 
problems faced by many financial markets in autumn 1998, equity prices rose sharply
in many countries to even more unsustainable levels. Clearly, the actual monetary
policy response had some desirable features but also some less desirable features. 
In this crisis stage of the cycle, there are again no easy answers.
II. Getting Out of Deflation?
The conventional wisdom would be that there should be more reliance on fiscal 
policy, since it works, and less reliance on monetary policy, since it does not work
given the assumed existence of a liquidity trap. Goodfriend takes a defiantly contrary
view. While I agree with a great deal of what he says, on balance I would come down
more on the side of conventional wisdom. 
The issue of monetary policy and the zero lower bound (ZLB) problem is of 
particular concern in Japan today. Goodfriend feels that it could be resolved by
imposing a negative rate of return on banks’ excess reserves and also on currency.
Practically, I doubt that this issue can be easily dealt with. Most currency is returned
to banks and then central banks through large retailers (especially those selling food)
who might feel inappropriately singled out for such attention by the tax authorities.
Nevertheless, Goodfriend is right to note that the monetary authorities, faced
with deflation, could buy massive amounts of assets both domestic and foreign to
break the downward asset price spiral and to stimulate price increases more generally.
As Milton Friedman famously noted, “Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary
phenomenon.” Yet there would be complications given such a policy. The assets 
purchased might fall in value rather than rise, leaving the central bank open to losses
and needful of injections of capital from the Treasury. This would be a clear threat to
central bank “independence,” though how much actual harm might be done is also
open to question.
A central bank having a clear mandate to pursue price stability, avoiding both
inflation and deflation, should not be much concerned about accepting balance-sheet
losses in the pursuit of its objective. That is what public policy is all about; positive
externalities require the public sector to pay certain costs. However, were a central
bank to embark upon such a course in the interest of “jump-starting” the economy, it
might at the same time wish to subject its actions to the discipline of a regime of
either inflation or price level targeting. To avoid the excesses that developed in the
late 1930s in Japan, it would be important to establish that “emergency” measures
were precisely that. Once economic growth had been reestablished, there would have
to be a politically agreed framework to ensure that inflation was not accepted as a
normal means to oil the wheels of the economy. In my view, pricelevel targeting has
special attributes since it allows a more expansionary policy if prices have been
declining for some time. Moreover, since the target is expressed in level terms there
should be no danger that an initial large increase in the rate of change of prices would
be thought of as a permanent phenomenon.
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If Goodfriend perhaps overestimates the role of monetary policy in deflationary
conditions, he perhaps underestimates the role of fiscal policy. I know of no con-
vincing empirical evidence that fiscal multipliers are less than one, much less zero.
Nevertheless, as Goodfriend implies, the way in which fiscal stimulus is conducted
surely matters. Many public-sector expenditures in Japan, particularly those designed
to support the construction and property sectors, are not expected to generate a 
positive social rate of return. This implies that the increased liabilities of taxpayers are
not offset by an increase in valuable assets, which is clearly an invitation to the
Ricardian Equivalence problem that Goodfriend rightly worries about.
If monetary and fiscal policies have a role to play in a deflationary period, so too
does bank restructuring. Arguably, deflation having negative implications for growth
49
only occurs when financial instability is a major complicating factor. In the first part
of his paper, Goodfriend correctly notes that forbearance can lead to heavy costs:
US$120 billion rather than US$20 billion had the savings and loan crisis in the
United States been promptly addressed. I would only add, based on the successful
experience of the Nordic countries in the early 1990s, that a prompt official response
should also be definitive, free from political interference, and wholly transparent 
with respect to the burden of costs above all. In many countries, bank restructuring
has fallen well short of these requirements. When, as Goodfriend states, it is the 
general public that refuses to face up to reality, then the public perhaps gets both 
the government and the form of bank restructuring which it deserves.
A last set of policies required to escape from a deflationary situation is not in fact
mentioned in Goodfriend’s paper. For the sake of completeness, these policies might
be noted here. If one believes, as the Austrian school of thought did, that profits 
are the key to the capitalist system, then steps must be taken to keep profits up even
as prices fall. Excess capacity must be written off and bankruptcies must be faced
squarely. Deregulation might well allow profitable diversification and investment in
sectors that had previously been unexploited. And, finally, real wages must adjust
downward in response to altered circumstances. Were nominal wages to remain static
as prices fell, the implications for rising unemployment would become as clear as
they became in the United States in the early 1930s.
Yet it must also be admitted that wages are income and that income drives 
consumption; falling real wages thus also have a downside. President Hoover was
fully aware of this latter possibility as he campaigned against wage cuts at the 
beginning of the 1930s in the United States. This is a further reason for suggesting
that, faced with serious deflationary tendencies, all of the weapons in the macro-
economic arsenal should be used to their full effect to ensure that aggregate demand
is maintained. The concept of “creative destruction” has a certain intuitive appeal,
but it should be remembered that the phrase was coined well before the onset of the
Great Depression.
49. See BIS (1999), chapter IV. Since the late 1800s, periods of deflation have also generally been periods of positive
(if moderated) real growth. The principal exception to this was the first few years of the Great Depression of 
the 1930s.Bank for International Settlements, 69th Annual Report, June 1999.
Borio, C., S. Kennedy, and S. D. Prowse, “Exploring Aggregate Asset Price Fluctuations across
Countries: Measurement, Determinants and Monetary Policy Implications,” BIS Economic
Papers, No. 40, April 1994.






This paper provides a very neat discussion of, according to the way I read the paper,
the transmission process of monetary policy with a special focus on factors such as
asset prices, the external finance premium, market liquidity, and more generally,
financial stability. Based on the discussion, there is also some suggestion as to what a
central bank can do when it hits the zero bound on interest rates.
I do not have too many things to quarrel with. So I have decided to do something
slightly different than a discussant would normally do. That is, I will briefly talk
about my experience with Japanese monetary policy during the last two years using
the nice toolkit offered by Marvin Goodfriend and from time to time offer some
comments on his paper. I think this is appropriate, because the course and effects of
recent Japanese monetary policy cannot be understood without reference to their
relationship with the question of financial stability.
II. Japanese Monetary Policy in the Late 1980s
Before I talk about the most recent period, let me briefly touch upon a theme that
has already come up and will continue to do so, in many people’s remarks at the 
conference. That is, whether a more prudent monetary policy in the late 1980s 
in Japan would have been possible, or have prevented the difficulties of the 1990s.
This is related to Goodfriend’s point that “A central bank should try hard not to 
be insufficiently preemptive during expansion. Benchmarking its policy against a 
rule may help.” 
Well, my answer to the above question is that it is hard to determine. If the sole
goal of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) was the stability of prices, it does not seem that the
BOJ needed more tightening in the 1980s. The rate of inflation peaked in 1991 only
at slightly above 3 percent. 
One could point out the difficulties in the mid- to late 1990s as something 
caused by the boom and bust cycle in asset prices, and hence argue that the boom
should have been milder, justifying a tighter policy in the late 1980s. But this is
almost saying that a central bank would do better by responding to a large rise in173
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asset prices, which is rejected by Goodfriend, among others. A large weight in the 
stability of real GDP in the BOJ’s objective function may have delivered something
different. I stop here on this point and look forward to hearing the views of others
during the conference.
III. Japan’s Bad-Loan Problem and Its Effects on the Economy
Anyway, the boom-bust cycle in asset prices led to a serious bad-loan problem. 
The government’s attitude toward the bad-loan problem was one of forbearance.
Goodfriend’s discussion of the incentive problems of bank managers has a lot of 
bearing on what happened in this economy. Given the existence of huge amounts of
bad loans, bank managers were reluctant to get into new, risky activities, and
investors were not willing to contribute new capital. It took the serious financial crisis
of 1997–98 for the government to appropriate the funds necessary for the resolution
of the crisis.
Meanwhile, the crisis that started in the fall of 1997 exerted serious impacts on
the financial system and the real side of the economy. The crisis was made even more
serious by the effects of the Russian crisis in the summer of 1998. Increasingly, banks
had to pay liquidity premiums in addition to credit risk premiums in raising funds.
Many companies had to forgo investment for liquidity reasons. Private fixed invest-
ment went down by about 3 percent between 1997/IV and 1998/IV, which exactly
matched the decline in GDP during the period.
IV. The Bank of Japan’s Monetary Policy between 1998–2000
The BOJ responded to the recession by cutting the overnight call rate by about 
20 basis points in September 1998 and again to zero in February–March 1999. Of
course, these were attempts to stimulate the economy through the usual interest rate
channel. But in addition, they were meant to address the liquidity crunch aspect of
the crisis. There is a nice discussion of this point in Goodfriend’s paper, where he
points out that a central bank can signal its intention to support market liquidity by
lowering short-term rates. 
The BOJ adopted a number of other measures to supplement the impaired ability
of the private financial system to carry out intermediation. For example, repo opera-
tions in commercial paper (CP) were successful in adding liquidity to the CP market.
They were also a way to lend to banks at a horizon of a few months and to contain
the rise in the term premium in the money market. 
I was at a conference organized by the Boston Fed about 10 months ago and said
that there were signs that the Japanese economy was bottoming out of the recession.
Some did not believe me. But now there are much clearer signs of improvements in
the economy. What the BOJ has been doing since 1998 has surely been a cause of the
improvements. But why such improvements out of a small, less than 50-basis-point
decrease in the overnight rate? One of the keys, I think, has been that the measurestaken by the BOJ, together with the recapitalization of banks and that of the credit
guarantee association, addressed the credit crunch nature of the recession. Again, the
desirability of such an action in the face of financial instability with liquidity 
problems is an important message of the Goodfriend paper.
V. Going beyond the Zero Nominal Interest Rate
What can we do after hitting the zero bound on nominal interest rates? I think 
I should wait until the end of this conference to discuss this in full, but let me 
briefly discuss what the BOJ has been doing and say a few words about Goodfriend’s
suggestions. 
Once the short rate is driven down to zero, one way to go further is to make 
commitments about future short rates. This is the approach we have been adopting
by use of an admittedly vague phrase, “until deflationary concerns dissipate.” Given
that the zero rate is still around, I think it is too early for me to discuss in detail what
the effects of the policy have been, or to discuss the similarities and dissimilarities
between the policy and other suggestions.
Let me nonetheless try a comparison between this approach and Goodfriend’s
suggestion of the purchase of government bonds. If the long rate is an average of
future short rates, it seems that a central bank cannot go beyond making com-
mitments about future short rates. In the presence of a risk premium that can be 
systematically exploited, outright purchase of long bonds may bring some value
added. Goodfriend justifies the existence of a risk premium by reference to broad 
liquidity services assets offer. How large a mileage one can get out of this is an open
question. My quick comment on this is that the effect would be large if monetary
base were exchanged for land rather than for government bonds, given the impor-
tance land plays in Japan’s economy as collateral. Of course, such an operation brings
its own problems as well.
An explicit attempt to exploit the risk premium component may backfire by 
raising a different risk premium. In the presence of huge budget deficits, an infla-
tion risk premium may go up through an expectation of a future monetization of 
government bonds.
I would also point out that to the extent that efforts to go beyond the zero rate 
are limited to making commitments about future short rates, the central bank does
not encounter a balance-sheet problem, unlike the case of outright purchase of 
government bonds. In other words, the problem is shifted to the fiscal authority as
has been the case in Japan where the Ministry of Finance (MOF) has been issuing
large amounts of treasury bills near zero interest rates. I am not trying to say one is
better than the other.
Finally, the idea of negative interest rates is an attractive one. However, I worry 
whether it does not bring other costs with it. For example, at some point in the chain
of transactions involving cash, someone has to determine the length of time currency
notes have spent outside the banking system, which is costly. Those who receive cash
without knowing the length of time seem to bear the risk of capital losses. For both
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reasons, people will try to economize on cash usage. This seems to lead to a decline
in the liquidity service cash is providing. I might add that a most difficult aspect of
the proposal would be a public relations problem, i.e., the difficulty of persuading the
public that generating negative interest rates is a rational policy decision.
General Discussion
On Marvin Goodfriend’s recommendation of benchmarking monetary policy actions
against a rule that has performed reasonably well, Hiroshi Fujiki pointed out that
such rules, including the Taylor rule, fail to capture not only those variables which
reflect the stability of the financial system, such as asset prices and bank lending, but
also the influence of technological advances on the economy. Spencer Dale felt that
the problem of asset prices was not so serious. After all, an important determinant of
asset price movements was the change in inflationary expectations, and it is possible
to incorporate this factor into the Taylor rule.
With regard to the potential for a “credibility trap” as described by Goodfriend,
John B. Taylor supported the need to be aware of the risk that low inflation will delay
preemptive policy responses and promote over-optimism. However, Dale thought
that this fear was slightly overstated since inflationary expectations should be
reflected in the price of financial assets. Mårten Blix commented that publishing 
the inflation forecast, for example in an inflation report, has the advantage that the 
central bank’s forecast can be contrasted to other forecasts. An inflation report is also
a natural forum to explain how—given the inflation forecast—the inflation target is
to be achieved. Allan H. Meltzer emphasized the warning signal effect of the money
supply growth rate. 
The focal issue was that of policy options for additional expansion. Negative
opinions were expressed by Georg Rich and Vítor Gaspar regarding the practical 
feasibility of negative interest rates through imposing a carry tax on the monetary
base. With regard to the large-scale purchase of long-term government bonds, Kazuo
Ueda maintained that he could not recommend such a policy option, because (1) it
could lead to an excessive commitment to future short-term interest rates; and (2) it
could also involve the risk of capital losses incurred on the central bank’s balance
sheet as a result of any future monetary tightening. Fujiki agreed on the effectiveness
of the purchase of long-term government bonds in theory, but believed that from 
a practical standpoint it would be necessary to articulate it in a full policy package.
He stressed the importance of a commitment by the government to the long-run
soundness of the fiscal budget in the light of the concern among the general public
about the already heavy burden of government debt. 
While admitting some usefulness of a significant volume of government bond
purchase by the central bank at the present juncture, William White thought it
important to establish some institutional framework that would prevent any 
detrimental impact on central bank independence and future inflation of such 
operations. Rich favored transmission paths via foreign exchange rates when the
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Regarding the importance of deregulation in new industries as a means of
breaking out of deflation, which White mentioned, Taylor argued that the benefits 
of corporate restructuring depended upon the strength of the economy as a whole;
Glenn Stevens also felt that an increase in aggregate demand would be essential to the
success of deregulation.